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EVIDENCE - CAN ADMISSIBILITY OF CO-DEFENDANTS'
CONFESSIONS UNDER THE HEARSAY RULES
SERVE AS A MINIMUM STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY
UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE?
Lee v. Illinois,
106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
Lee v. Illinois1 concerns the claim by Millie R. Lee that her
confrontation clause rights were violated when the trial judge,
in a joint bench trial, expressly relied on her non-testifying co-
defendant's inculpating confession to find her guilty of two murd-
ers.' The state contended that the co-defendant's confession was
admissible against Lee on the grounds that it was reliable because
of the circumstances of its making, because it "interlocked" with
Lee's own confession, and because it was against the penal in-
terest of the co-defendant.' In order to analyze the Court's rejec-
tion of all three state-proposed bases for reliability sufficient to
warrant admission, this paper will examine the Court's decision
in Lee in light of (1) the Court's interpretation of the confronta-
tion clause, particularly as it relates to inculpatory co-defendants'
statements, and (2) the development and meaning of the "decla-
ration against penal interest" exception' to the rule against hearsay.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Millie Renee Lee and her boyfriend, Edwin Thomas, were tried
in a joint bench trial for the double murder of Lee's aunt, Mattie
Darden (Aunt Beedie), and her aunt's friend, Odessa Harris.
Neither defendant testified at trial. Thomas' confession was ad-
mitted into evidence against him and the trial judge expressly re-
lied on Thomas' confession in finding Lee guilty of murder.' Lee
1. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
2. Id. at 2061.
3. Id. at 2064.
4. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
5. Lee v. nlinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
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had confessed to involvement only in the killing of her aunt; her
confession implicated Thomas in the killing of Aunt Beedie and
attributed the killing of Odessa entirely to him. With knowledge
that Lee had implicated him,6 Thomas had made a statement which
paralleled Lee's in many respects but which additionally impli-
cated her in prior planning of the killing of Aunt Beedie and in
the killing of Odessa." At trial, as mitigation for her participation
in the killing of Aunt Beedie, Lee suggested a theory of provoca-
tion or, alternatively, of unreasonable belief in self defense.' In
closing argument, the prosecutor used portions of Thomas' con-
fession (incorrectly attributing them to Lee) which indicated both
a joint premeditated plan -to kill both women and Lee's assistance
in the killing of Odessa.9 Lee was found guilty and sentenced to
life imprisonment for the murder of Aunt Beedie and to forty years
in prison for the murder of Odessa."°
6. Both Lee and Thomas had been brought in for questioning and each had asked to be allowed to see
the other. After the police had obtained Lee's confession, they permitted her to meet with Thomas. The police
indicated to Thomas that Lee had implicated him when they met and when they met she told Thomas that the
police knew about the "whole thing" and reminded him that he had said they "wouldn't let one or the other
take the rap alone . . . ." Id. at 2058.
7. Lee's statement indicated that she and Thomas had discussed doing something to stop her aunt's harass-
ment of Lee and that "Edwin used to get mad.., and he couldn't take much more... he began talking about
doing something to [her] but he never said what." Thomas' statement, however, indicated that he and Lee had
previously discussed killing Aunt Beedie and that immediately prior to the killings he had asked Lee if "she
still want[ed] to go through with it?" His statement also indicated joint planning and participation in Odessa's
killing: "We decided that if we did something to Aunt Beedie, we had to do something with Odessa ....
We had plained [sic] that [Lee] was supposed to get Odessa to stand, with her back toward the front room,
looking into the kitchen, while I would grab her from the back using the big knife . . . ." Lee's statement
included the assertion that she had called Odessa to the kitchen to ask her whether Aunt Beedie had "really"
paid the rent (her confession indicated her aunt had not been home for several days but had called Lee to tell
her the rent had been paid on the apartment they shared). Joint Appendix at 5, Lee (People's Exhibit No. 22,
introduced into evidence at trial, Statement by Millie R. Lee on February 15, 1982). Lee also asserted that
as Odessa left the kitchen, Thomas stabbed her. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2058-59.
8. Her confession indicated that after Thomas had stabbed Odessa, Lee went into Aunt Beedie's bedroom
and that Aunt Beedie had a knife, threatened to kill Lee and brandished the knife at her. Lee left the bedroom
and went into the kitchen and got a butcher knife and went back into the bedroom and stabbed her aunt repeat-
edly. Id. at 2059. In closing argument, Lee's counsel argued that the stabbing resulted from a struggle between
Lee and Aunt Beedie and that Lee had been acting under the unreasonable belief that the stabbing constituted
self-defense or, alternatively, under the influence of provocation to sudden and intense passion. Id. at 2060.
9. Id. at 2060.
10. Id. at 2061.
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The state appellate court, fully aware that the trial court had
considered Thomas' confession in finding Lee guilty, neverthe-
less found no violation of Lee's confrontation clause rights be-
cause Lee's and Thomas' confessions were "interlocking."1 The
Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 2
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of cer-
tiorari in order to address the question of whether Lee's sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights to confront witnesses against her were
violated by the trial court's consideration of the inculpatory con-
fession of her non-testifying co-defendant as substantive evidence
of her guilt. 3 The Court reversed Lee's conviction, holding that
"on the record before us there is no occasion to depart from the
time-honored teaching that a co-defendant's confession inculpat-
ing the accused is inherently unreliable, and that convictions sup-
ported by such evidence violate the constitutional right of
"114confrontation.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
A. The Confrontation Clause.
The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."'"
The United States Supreme Court's first interpretation of this clause
11. Id. The Appellate Court of Illinois, in rejecting Lee's argument on appeal that her confrontation rights
had been violated, concluded that the "interlocking" confessions did not fall within the rule of Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Petitioner's Brief at 12, Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986) (quoting People
v. Millie R. Lee, No. 5-82-539 (Il1. App. Ct., Fifth District, Dec. 7, 1984)). The Appellate Court stated the
rule from Bruton was that the "admission of a co-defendant's extrajudicial statement that inculpates the other
defendant violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him." Id. (quoting Peo-
ple v. Millie R. Lee, No. 5-82-539 (Ill. App. Ct., Fifth District, Dec. 7, 1984)). Without defining "interlock-
ing," the court noted that "it is well settled that a substantial difference exists between the Bruton rule and
the interlocking confessions situation." Id. (quoting People v. Millie R. Lee, No. 5-82-539 (Ill. App. Ct., Fifth
District, Dec. 7, 1984)). The court stated that in a Bruton situation the "jury hears only the co-defendant's
statement incriminating the defendant who has himself made no admission whatsoever" while in the situation
of interlockng confessions, the "jury hears a co-defendant's statement incriminating the defendant who had himself
made similar inculpatory admissions." Id. (quoting People v. Millie R. Lee, No. 5-82-539 (Ill. App. Ct., Fifth
District, Dec. 7, 1984)). The court concluded that "when the interlocking admissions are inculpatory, the ad-
mission of co-defendant's incriminating statement against defendant does not fall within the Bruton rule." Id.
(quoting People v. Millie R. Lee, No. 5-82-539 (111. App. Ct., Fifth District, Dec. 7, 1984)). For this conclu-
sion, the court relied on two state court cases, People v. Bassett, 56 III. 2d 285, 295, 307 N.E.2d 359, 365
(1974); and People v. Rosochacki, 41 11. 2d 483, 492, 244 N.E.2d 136, 141-42 (1969). Id. (citing People
v. Millie R. Lee, No. 5-82-539 (Ill. App. Ct., Fifth District, Dec. 7, 1984)).
12. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2061.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2065.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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was in 1895 in the case of Mattox v. United States" in which the
Court explained the purpose of the clause:
[Tihe primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or exparte
affidavit such as were sometimes admitted... in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination
of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
1 7
Despite the absolute language of the amendment and the broad
interpretation of its meaning, the Mattox Court ruled that the use
at trial of a transcription of the prior testimony of former wit-
nesses who had since died did not violate the defendant's con-
frontation clause rights." The Court reasoned that since Mattox
had, in the prior trial, the "advantage . . .of seeing the witness
face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-
examination," his constitutional guarantee to confrontation had
been preserved. 9 In addition to prescribing cross-examination as
a means of assuring that only reliable evidence is introduced
against the accused, the Mattox Court, in a less often cited por-
tion of its opinion, also set forth arguments for the limitations
on the reach of the confrontation clause:
[Riules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. To say that
a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot
free simply because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional
protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public
shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.
Observing that it was required to interpret the Constitution so as
to secure to every person the rights he possessed at the time of
its adoption, the Court noted that many constitutional rights are
"subject to exceptions, recognized long before the adoption of the
Constitution, and not interfering at all with its spirit." 21 The Mat-
tox Court's expression of the competing interests which are in-
16. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
17. Id. at 242-43.
18. Id. at 244.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 243.
21. Id. The Court specifically pointed to the admission of dying declarations as an exception which was
"obviously intended to be respected." The Court observed that to deny the admission of dying declarations
because of "technical adherence to... a constitutional provision" would go beyond what is necessary to protect
the accused and too far for the safety of the public. The Court thought that the uncross-examined dying declara-
tion was competent testimony which should be admitted "from the necessities of the case, and to prevent a
manifest failure of justice." Id. at 244. Four years after Mattox, the Court in Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S.
47 (1899), noted that "a fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved against
an accused ...except by witnesses who confront him at trial, upon whom he can look while being tried,
whom he is entitled to cross-examine . . . ." Id. at 55.
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volved in deciding what evidence may be introduced against a
criminal defendant foreshadows the difference of opinion between
the majority and the minority in Lee as to whether Thomas' con-
fession could be used against Lee. The majority in Lee focused
on the need to assure fairness to Lee by excluding evidence which
was not reliable, "2 while the minority focused on society's practi-
cal interest in effective law enforcement and the consequent neces-
sity for admitting the evidence of an unavailable declarant.2"
While the mandate of the confrontation clause is still far from
clear, the current understanding of its guarantee is derived primar-
ily from cases decided since 1965 when the Supreme Court, in
Pointer v. Texas,24 made the clause applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment.25 The modern cases, viewed chrono-
logically from 1965 to the present, seem to fall into two distinct
groupings. The cases which were decided prior to 1970 suggest
that the Court followed the Mattox Court's equation of confron-
tation with cross-examination and viewed the confrontation clause
as a strong limiting influence on testimony which could be ad-
mitted against a defendant in criminal trials. "7
Beginning in 1970, the Court's emphasis seemed to shift from
protection of the individual criminal defendant to a concern for
societal interests in effective law enforcement. Two of these earlier
defendant-protective cases, Pointer v. Texas "8 and Barber v.
Page,29 dealt with the admissibility of testimony given at a prelimi-
nary hearing. In both instances the Court found that the use of
22. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2061-65.
23. Id. at 2066-71.
24. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
25. For an overview of the few early cases and the historical arguments about the intent of the clause, see
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 551-55 (2d ed. 1982). For other treat-
ments of historical intent see: Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L.
REV. 207, 208-17 (1984); Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 CiuM. L. BULL. 99, 100-01 (1972). A study of history has not lent much certainty to current
understanding of the practical meaning of the clause to criminal defendants. Justice Harlan, concurring in Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), observed that "the Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment.
History seems to give us very little insight into [itsl intended scope . . . ." Id. at 173-74.
26. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
27. Some of the tone of the Court's approach during that time is captured in the often quoted passages from
Pointer: "[Tihe right of cross examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront
the witnesses against him." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 404. "There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which
this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right
of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial
which is this country's constitutional goal." Id. at 405. Pointer's emphasis on cross-examination is strongly
supported in the other cases decided before 1970. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719 (1968); and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
28. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
29. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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such testimony without cross-examination was a violation of the
defendant's confrontation clause rights. In Pointer, the prosecu-
tion had introduced testimony given at a preliminary hearing at
which Pointer, unrepresented by counsel, did not attempt to cross-
examine the witness. The Court observed that "a major reason
underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defen-
dant charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him"30 but emphasized the point that there may have
been no violation of Pointer's rights had the witness' statement
been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which Pointer had been
represented by counsel with an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine. 1 While requiring cross-examination as an element of
confrontation, the Pointer Court suggested that the cross-
examination need not take place at the trial itself 2 and that it might
be excused altogether in the case of dying declarations and "other
analogous situations.""
In the second of the preliminary hearing cases, Barber v. Page,'M
the Court found that the prosecution's use of testimony given at
a preliminary hearing violated Barber's confrontation clause rights
even though he had been represented by counsel and he had been
given the opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hear-
ing."5 The Court indicated that the failure of Barber's counsel to
actually cross-examine at the preliminary hearing did not consti-
tute a waiver of his right to cross-examine at trial.3 In contrast
to the Pointer Court's suggestion that cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing might have sufficed to meet confrontation
clause requirements, the Barber Court stated that it would have
found Barber's confrontation rights violated even if his counsel
had actually cross-examined the witness at the preliminary hear-
ing because the state had made no showing that the witness was
unavailable at trial and because:
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both opportunity to cross-examine and
the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness .... While there may be some justifica-
tion for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satis-
fies the demand of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable,
37this is not . . . such a case.
30. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 406-07.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The Court, noting that it had previously approved the admission of dying declarations and the testimony
of a deceased witness who had testified at a former trial, observed that "[tlhere are other analogous situations"
which might excuse the absence of confrontation. Id.
34. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 719.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 725.
37. Id. at 725-26.
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. The Court in Barber made it clear that the unavailability of a
witness at trial does not excuse the lack of confrontation unless
the prosecution has "made a good faith effort to obtain [the wit-
ness'] presence at trial.
'3 8
Two other cases decided before 1970, Douglas v. Alabama9
and Bruton v. United States, 4 gave additional support to the no-
tion that confrontation required cross-examination and that the
confrontation clause was a potent influence in excluding out-of-
court statements against the accused. In Douglas, an inculpatory
confession by an alleged accomplice was put before the jury by
the prosecutor who read the confession in order to "refresh the
memory" of the accomplice who refused to answer questions. 1
Because the alleged accomplice did not acknowledge the state-
ment implicating Douglas as one made by him, he could not be
cross-examined on the statement. The Court concluded that Doug-
las' confrontation clause rights had been violated."2 Though the
accomplice's statement was never technically in evidence, the
Court found that the fact that it had been heard by the jury and
was the only direct evidence of Douglas' guilt was sufficient to
deny his "right of cross-examination secured by the Confronta-
tion Clause.43 The Court's emphasis on the importance of the ac-
complice's statement to the prosecutor's case and on the statement's
potential impact on the jury, rather than on the form of the tes-
timony, is clearly reflected in later decisions which characterize
the confrontation clause as advancing "a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials"" by
providing the trier of fact with a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the testimony.
The last of the pre-1970 cases to be considered here, Bruton
v. United States, 5 involved the joint trial of two defendants in
which the prosecution introduced testimony concerning one defen-
dant's confession which implicated both defendants. Even though
the trial court had given instructions limiting the jury's consider-
ation of the confession to its maker, the Court found that Bru-
38. Id. at 724-25. The preliminary hearing witness against Barber was, by the time of trial, incarcerated
outside the state. The Court noted that because of increased cooperation between the states and the federal
government and among the states themselves, "the mere absence of a witness from the jurisdiction was [not]
sufficient ground for dispensing with confrontation . . . ." Id. at 723.
39. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
40. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
41. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 416 (1965).
42. Id. at 419-20.
43. Id.
44. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
45. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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ton's right to confrontation was violated because the jury might
not have been able to heed the instructions and because Bruton's
co-defendant, having refused to take the stand, was not available
for cross-examination."6 Of major importance in Bruton is the
Court's discussion of the unreliable yet "powerfully incriminat-
ing" 7 nature of co-defendants' confessions:
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is
so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant that the practical and human limita-
tions of the jury system cannot be ignored. (citations omitted) Such a context is presented here, where
the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co-defendant, who stands accused side-by-
side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incrimi-
nations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when
accomplices do take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the
recognized motivation to shift blame onto others. (footnote omitted) The unreliability of such evidence
is intolerably compounded when the accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-
examination. It was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed.4a
Although the Court in Bruton rested its holding on confronta-
tion clause grounds, the opinion has also had an effect on federal
evidentiary rules. Justice Brennan's statements that "the hearsay
statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible against
him under traditional rules of evidence"" and that the nontestify-
ing co-defendant's statement inculpating the accused did not con-
stitute "any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as
petitioner is concerned"" have been interpreted as barring the ad-
mission of inculpatory co-defendants' statements under FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(3). s1
46. Id. at 137.
47. Id. at 135.
48. Id. at 135-36. The strong prohibition against the admission of the inculpating statements of a nontestify-
ing co-defendant was later limited by the harmless error analysis in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250
(1969). Harrington involved a trial of four co-defendants in which three co-defendants" confessions were in-
troduced with limiting instructions that the jury was to consider each confession only against the confessor.
Two of the co-defendants did not take the stand. The Court held that the Bruton error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt because the case against Harrington, aside from the co-defendants' confessions, was so over-
whelming. Id. at 254. The Court reaffirmed this position in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972), observ-
ing that:
The mere finding of a violation of the Bruton rule in the course of the trial, however, does not auto-
matically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction. In some cases the properly admitted evi-
dence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so
insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the
admission was harmless error.
405 U.S. at 430.
49. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3.
50. Id.
51. FEo. R. EvID. 804(b)(3); Report of House Comm. on Judiciary. See infra text accompanying notes
110-132.
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The force of the Bruton rule has been somewhat diminished
52
by later exceptions in situations where (1) the confessing co-
defendant testifies at trial and is cross-examined;" (2) the co-
defendant's confession does not directly implicate the accused; 4
and (3) there are interlocking co-defendants' confessions, i.e., each
co-defendant has made a statement which is "substantially simi-
lar" to that of the other. 5 In addition to these subsequently adopt-
ed limitations, the Bruton holding was limited at the outset to jury
trials; the presumption continued after Bruton that, in a bench
trial, the judge had the ability to disregard a co-defendant's state-
ment which incriminated an accused.5 6 The Bruton rule has,
however, been invoked when a judge has demonstrated his reli-
ance on the inadmissible evidence.5 ' The limitations on the Bru-
ton rule" were developed during the 1970's when the Court
appeared in other cases to be limiting the strength of protection
afforded to the accused by the confrontation clause.5 9 Even though
the holdings in Pointer, Douglas, Barber and Bruton had been
52. Professor Haddad suggests that the exceptions to Bruton developed largely in response to the Court's
giving retroactive effect to Bruton in state prosecutions through its holding in Roberts v. Russell. 392 U. S.
293 (1968). Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration of the Confrontation Rationale, and a
Proposal For a Due Process Evaluation of Limiting Instructions, 18 CRtM. L. BULL. 1, 5 (1980).
53. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
54. United States v. Roberts, 483 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1973).
55. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979). The Court in Parker held that the admission of"interlocking"
confessions accompanied by limiting instructions did not violate the confrontation clause; the Court set forth
its rationale for holding Bruton inapplicable in such situations:
ITIhe incriminating statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, be of the 'devastating' character
referred to in Bruton when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected
by Bruton - the 'constitutional right of cross examination' - . . . has far less practical value to a defen-
dant who has confessed to the crime than one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Success-
fully impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross examination would likely yield small advantage
to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged. Nor does the natural
'motivation to shift blame onto others,' recognized by the Bruton Court to render the incriminating
statements of codefendants 'inevitably suspect' . . . require application of the Bruton rule when the
incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame onto himself.
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. at 73.
Where co-defendants have each confessed, Parker provides an alternative to the harmless error rule earlier
adopted in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment in
Parker, preferred to base his judgment on the ground that "any error that existed in the admission of the confes-
sions of the codefendants, in violation of Bruton v. United States . . . was, on the facts of this case, clearly
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. at 77. Recognizing that in interlocking
confessions cases, any error in admitting the co-defendant's confession would usually be harmless, he would
nevertheless find it necessary to weigh all the circumstances "in order to determine whether the defendant in
fact was prejudiced by the admission of even an interlocking confession." Id. at 79.
56. See Haddad, supra note 52 at 26-28.
57. United States v. Longee, 603 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1979)(Judge's specific reference to co-defendant's
statement was reversible error); In re Appeal No. 977, 22 Md. App. 511, 517, 323 A.2d 663, 667 (1974)(In
a juvenile court hearing, the judge affirmatively chose to consider and give pivotal weight to inadmissible
statement).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 60-99.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
narrowly limited to the respective facts of the case,"° their tone
and sweeping language suggested that the constitutional right to
confrontation was a robust force in protecting criminal defendants
by requiring cross-examination of testimony which was introduced
against them and by placing on the state an affirmative burden
to produce, or make a good faith effort to produce, witnesses
whose testimony it sought to introduce at trial.
These early cases focused almost exclusively on the protection
of the rights of the accused; contemporaneous cross-examination
was the ideal way of meeting confrontation clause requirements
but prior cross-examination was, in certain circumstances, suffi-
cient to satisfy the guarantee of confrontation. Beginning in 1970,
the Court's approach to confrontation clause analysis seemed to
shift. 1 Moving from an almost exclusive concentration on the
rights of the defendant, the Court appeared to adopt an analytical
stance which was directed toward addressing the tension between
the competing interests of society on the one hand and the ac-
cused on the other." In the early cases which focused primarily
on the rights of the accused, confrontation seemed to require cross-
examination; in the later cases, the Court found that substitutes
for cross-examination could safeguard the accused while still meet-
ing the societal need of going forward with prosecutions.
In 1970, with its decision in California v. Green, 3 the Court
appeared to moderate its stance on the power of the confronta-
tion clause to exclude testimony in criminal trials. In that case,
a witness for the state who had identified the defendant in an un-
sworn statement to a police officer and in sworn testimony at a
preliminary hearing claimed, at trial, a lack of memory regard-
ing the subject of his prior statements.6" The California Supreme
Court held that admission of the testimony violated the confron-
60. Noting the admissibility of prior cross-examined testimony of a deceased witness and of dying declara-
tions, the Court in Pointer observed that "[t]here are other analogous situations which might not fall within
the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation of witnesses." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 407.
The Court noted in Douglas that "7iln the circumstances of this case, petitioners's inability to cross-examine
Loyd as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confronta-
tion Clause." (emphasis added). Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 419. The Barber Court observed that "[wihile
there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a prelimi-
nary hearing satisfies the demand of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavail-
able, this is not, as we have pointed out, such a case." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 725. In Bruton the Court
stated that "[niot every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible
error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evi-
dence creeps in, usually inadvertently." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 135.
61. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
62. This tension was originally addressed in Mattox. See supra text accompanying notes 16-23.
63. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
64. Id. at 151-52.
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tation clause because there had been no opportunity for contem-
poraneous cross-examination." Contrary to an earlier indication
that use of preliminary hearing testimony would be unacceptable
because confrontation is "basically a trial right,"66 the Green Court
found no problem with the admission of the testimony taken at
a preliminary hearing. 7 The Court concluded:
[T]he Confrontation Clause does not require excluding from evidence the prior statements of a witness
who concedes making the statements, and who may be asked to defend or otherwise explain the incon-
sistency between his prior and his present version of the events in question, thus opening himself to
full cross-examination at trial as to both stories.
68
The Court went even further; it stated that the witness' prelimi-
nary hearing testimony could have been admitted at trial whether
or not Green had had "an effective opportunity for confrontation
at the subsequent trial." 9 Admission of the testimony would have
been acceptable to the Court because the preliminary hearing had
provided "circumstances closely approximating those that surround
the typical trial," i.e., at the preliminary hearing the witness was
under oath, the defendant was represented by counsel and had
the opportunity to cross-examine, and "the proceedings were con-
ducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial
record of the hearings. 70
Noting that the California hearsay exception allowing the sub-
stantive use of prior inconsistent statements represented a depar-
ture from the orthodox view which permits such statements only
for impeachment, the Court saw its task in Green as deciding
"whether a defendant's constitutional right 'to be confronted with
the witnesses against him' is necessarily inconsistent with a State's
decision to change its hearsay rules to reflect the minority view."71
The Court in an often-quoted passage observed that hearsay rules
and the confrontation clause are not equivalent:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed
to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that
the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their
65. Id. at 150-51. The California Supreme Court held a state rule of evidence:
unconstitutional insofar as it permitted the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements of a wit-
ness, even though the statements were subject to examination at an earlier hearing because belated
cross examination before the trial 'is not an adequate substitute for the right to cross examination con-
temporaneous with the original testimony before a different tribunal.'
California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 150.
66. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 725.
67. California v. Green, 39'9 U.S. at 167-68.
68. Id. at 164.
69. Id. at 165-66.
70. Id. at 165.
71. Id. at 155.
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exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though
the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception .... The con-
verse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long established hearsay
rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.72
Six months after Green, the Court in Dutton v. Evans73 found
no confrontation clause violation when the state introduced a co-
conspirator's statement which was made not in furtherance but
in concealment of the conspiracy.7" At Evans' murder trial, the
state introduced a witness who testified that the declarant (Evans'
alleged accomplice) had, during concealment of the conspiracy,
made an ambiguous one-sentence statement tending to inculpate
Evans . 7 Evans argued that the state hearsay exception which al-
lowed admission of such a statement was unconstitutional since
it was broader than the hearsay exception applicable to conspira-
cy trials in the federal courts.76 Justice Stewart, writing for the
plurality, emphasized that this case differed from the early cases
in which the Court had found confrontation clause violations in
that there was in this case (1) no evidence introduced against Evans
which was "devastating" or "crucial," (2) no use or misuse of a
confession made in the coercive atmosphere of official investiga-
tion, and (3) no suggestion of prosecutorial misconduct.,7 The
Court explained that the disputed testimony was "of peripheral
significance at most" in the context of the trial, in which there
was testimony from twenty cross-examined witnesses including
an "eyewitness who described all the details of the triple murd-
er. ' 8 In addition to considering the relative weight and effect of
the challenged statement against Evans as a factor in its confron-
tation clause analysis, the Court also stressed the reliability of
the statement as a factor to be considered. 9 The Court held that
the accomplice's statement was "spontaneous, and it was against
his penal interest" and concluded that "[t]hese are indicia of relia-
bility which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether
a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no con-
frontation of the declarant."8
In another effort to provide guidance as to the meaning and oper-
72. Id. at 155-56.
73. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
74. Id. at 78.
75. Id. at 77.
76. Id. at 80.
77. Id. at 87.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 89.
80. Id.
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ation of the confrontation clause, the Court in 1980 in Ohio v.
Roberts" overturned a state court's decision that a defendant's con-
frontation clause rights had been violated.8" Roberts involved the
use of a witness' statement taken at a preliminary hearing; the
defense had called the witness and when she gave testimony ad-
verse to Roberts, his defense counsel did not seek to have her
declared a hostile witness and subjected to cross-examination. 3
At trial, the prosecutor, after a showing that the witness was un-
available, introduced the transcript of her preliminary hearing tes-
timony under a state hearsay exception for prior testimony.8 The
state supreme court, relying on California v. Green, reversed
Roberts' conviction, holding that "the mere opportunity to cross
examine at a preliminary hearing does not afford constitutional
confrontation for purposes of trial. '"85 Justice Blackmun prefaced
the decision in Roberts with an explication of the competing in-
terests the Court had sought to serve in its previous confronta-
tion clause cases. He noted that a literal reading of the sixth
amendment provision that "the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him" would require an
unintended and undesirable result: "the exclusion of any statement
made by a declarant not present at trial" and the abrogation of
"virtually every hearsay exception."86 Justice Blackmun cited both
historical and policy arguments that the confrontation clause should
function to exclude some hearsay in the interest of preserving the
integrity of the fact-finding process at trial."8 To this end, he not-
ed, "[t]he Court has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause
reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, (foot-
note omitted) and that 'a primary interest secured by [the clause]
is the right of cross-examination.' "88 Justice Blackmun suggest-
ed, however, that the accused's interest in confrontation competes
with the strong interest of every jurisdiction in effective law en-
forcement and in "the development and precise formulation of the
rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings." 9 He ob-
served that the Court's attempts to accommodate these compet-
ing interests have been not an effort to "map out a theory of the
Confrontation Clause that would determine the validity of
81. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
82. id. at 60-61.
83. Id. at 58.
84. Id. at 59.
85. id. at 61.
86. Id. at 62-63.
87. id. at 63-64.
88. Id. at 63 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)).
89. Id. at 64.
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all . . . hearsay 'exceptions,' " but a gradual process, "building
on past decisions, drawing on new experience, and responding
to changing conditions."9
The Roberts Court summarized the meaning of the confronta-
tion clause:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay.
First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment
establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has
occurred), the prosecutor must produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose state-
ment it wishes to use against the defendant. (citation omitted)
9 1
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying pur-
pose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to
test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that
'there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.' (citation omitted)
92
The Court has applied this 'indicia of reliability' requirement principally by concluding that certain
hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within
them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' (citation omitted) This reflects
the truism that 'hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values,' (citation omitted) and 'stem from the same roots,' (citation omitted) It also responds to the
need for certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials.
93
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation
Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only
if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be ex-
cluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
94
The Court, analyzing the facts of Roberts against the now ex-
plicit requirements of (1) unavailability and (2) indicia of relia-
bility, found no confrontation clause violation.9" The Roberts
two-part test for determining which evidence will meet confron-
tation clause requirements for admission is so framed as to sug-
gest a sequential analysis in which the trial court must first
determine that the witness cannot be produced at trial and then,
only if the witness is unavailable, must establish that the proposed
submission is sufficiently reliable to safeguard the defendant's
rights to a fair trial.96 Under this reading, if the witness who gave
90. Id. at 64-65. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 162).
91. Id. at 65. The Court cited in support of this proposition Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); California
v. Green 399, U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); and Motes v. United States, 178 U.S.
458 (1900). The Court in a footnote to the quoted passage said "[a] demonstration of unavailability, however,
is not always required." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
92. Id. at 65. The Court cited Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. at 107 and quoted from Mancusi v. Stubbs
a summary of the Court's focus on the indicia of reliability necessary to place a statement before the jury without
confrontation.
93. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 74. The Court found that the witness was unavailable "in the constitutional sense" because the
state had made a good faith effort to locate and produce her at trial. Id. at 75. The reliability prong of the
test was satisfied because defense counsel's thorough direct examination of the witness at the preliminary hear-
ing was substantially equivalent to cross-examination. Id. at 72-73.
96. Id. at 65.
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the former testimony is available for trial, his evidence could not
be admitted no matter how reliable it might be. Should the propo-
nent of former testimony be able, however, to demonstrate the
unavailability of the declarant, the former testimony would have
to possess the necessary "indicia of reliability." The majority in
Lee, in applying the Roberts two-pronged test, did not address
availability but found Lee's rights violated solely on the basis of
the unreliability of the evidence admitted against her." This sug-
gests that when the Roberts test is the appropriate test for a given
category of evidence,98 it need not necessarily be applied in se-
quence, i.e., it appears that if either of the two conditions fail,
the evidence must be excluded.
In 1986, in United States v. Inadi99 the Court had occasion to
re-interpret the requirements of the confrontation clause which
it had set forth in Roberts. The challenged evidence admitted
against Inadi consisted of a nontestifying co-conspirator's extraju-
dicial statements which satisfied the requirements for admission
under the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE."o° Following what it un-
derstood to be the "clear constitutional rule" of Roberts, i.e., that
the government must show the unavailability of the declarant as
a condition to admission of any out-of-court statement, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Inadi's conviction for conspira-
cy.1"1 The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, explaining
that the Roberts unavailability requirement had "simply reaffirmed
a long-standing rule . ..that applies unavailability analysis to
prior testimony."102 Suggesting that an unavailability requirement
for co-conspirator statements would provide little, if any, benefit
to the defendant, the Court emphasized the burden such a rule
would place on the prosecution."0 It affirmed the validity of the
use of co-conspirator statements, and declined to require a show-
ing of unavailability as a prerequisite to their admission, conclud-
ing that "[a] rule that required each invocation of Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
to be accompanied by a decision on the declarant's availability
would impose a substantial burden on the entire criminal justice
system."1 "' The Court contrasted the nature of former testimony
97. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2061.
98. The Court has said that the Roberts holding is applicable to cases involving prior testimony. See infra
text accompanying notes 99-106.
99. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1121.
100. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E).
101. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1124.
102. Id. at 1126. The Court observed in a footnote that, in the federal courts, the unavailability rule for
former trial testimony was established in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
103. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1128-29.
104. Id. at 1128.
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with the nature of co-conspirators' statements to explain why un-
availability is not required:
Unlike some other exceptions to the hearsay rule, or the exemption from the hearsay definition in-
volved in this case, former testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom
has independent evidentiary significance of its own, but is intended to replace live testimony . ... But
if the declarant is unavailable, no 'better' version of the evidence exists, and the former testimony may
be admitted as a substitute for live testimony on the same point.
Those same principles do not apply to co-conspirator exceptions. Because they are made while the
conspiracy is in progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot
be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court . . . . [T]he statement will
often derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was made .... Even when the declar-
ant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the eviden-
tiary value of his statements during the course of the conspiracy.
The Court's balancing in Inadi of the competing interests of the
accused and the public was weighted heavily toward protecting
the public. The primacy of the societal interest may be attributa-
ble, at least in part, to the fact that the acts and declarations of
Inadi's co-conspirator occurred during the conspiracy and were
acts for which he was criminally responsible under substantive
law. 
106
The cases for which the Court granted writs of certiorari from
1970 until 1986 suggest that, having established in its early cases
the confrontation rights of an accused defendant, the Court recog-
nized a need to limit the reach of the clause in order to achieve
some equilibrium between the opposing interests of society on
the one hand and of the criminal defendant on the other.10 To
advance criminal prosecutions and yet continue to provide to the
accused an effective barrier to the admission against him of un-
reliable evidence, the Court undertook the gradual process of try-
ing to formulate the safeguards which would provide guarantees
of trustworthiness which would be substantially equivalent to the
protection offered by contemporaneous cross-examination. In this
process, the Court found that under certain circumstances, equiva-
lent guarantees of reliability could be assured (1) when there was
105. Id. at 1126.
106. C. McCORMICK, McCoRMICK ON EvIDENCE § 267 (3d ed. 1984). Judge Learned Hand in Van Riper
v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926), observed that
[sluch declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law of evidence, but of the substantive law
of crime. When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for
one another, and have made 'a partnership in crime.' What one does pursuant to their common pur-
pose, all do, and, as declarations may be such acts, they are competent against all.
107. In each of the post-1970 cases just discussed, California v. Green, Dutton v. Evans, Ohio v. Roberts
and United States v. Inadi, the Court found no violation of the accused's confrontation clause rights. Other
cases heard during this period confirm this limiting trend. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985); Par-
ker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); and Nelson v. O'Neil, 402
U.S. 622 (1971).
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prior cross-examination under trial-like conditions,"°8 and (2) when
the evidence was neither "crucial" nor "devastating" and exhibit-
ed adequate "indicia of reliability.""0 9
B. The Development of the Hearsay Exception for Declarations
Against Penal Interest.
In Lee v. Illinois,1 ' when the state asserted that Edwin Tho-
mas' statement should be admissible against Lee because it was
against Thomas' penal interest, Justice Brennan responded for the
Court:
We reject respondent's categorization of the hearsay involved in this case as a simple 'declaration
against penal interest.' That concept defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause anal-
ysis. We decide this case as involving a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal
defendant.
111
In deciding whether the use of Thomas' confession violated Lee's
confrontation clause rights, the Court chose to characterize the
confession admitted against Lee as a hearsay statement for which
there is no exception under the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 12
as opposed to a statement against penal interest which does not
have to be excluded under those rules."' An examination of the
development of the hearsay exception for declarations against penal
interest, FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(3), suggests an ex-
planation for the Court's choice of analytical category.
The original Supreme Court Advisory Committee's proposal
for the hearsay exception for declarations against interest includ-
ed a prohibition against the receipt of a co-defendant's hearsay
confession offered against the accused in a criminal trial. The pro-
posed exception read as follows:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by
him against another or to make'him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disapproval, that a reasona-
ble man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. This exam-
ple does not include a statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made
by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused.
1 1 4
108. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
109. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1981); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
110. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
Ill. Id. at 2064 n.5.
112. FED. R. Evto. 801, 802.
113. FED. R. EVtD. 804(b)(3).
114. The language of the exception was in keeping with the original casting of exceptions as "examples of
statements conforming with the requirements of the rule" which were to serve as "illustrations only, and not
by way of limitation." 46 F.R.D. 161, 377 (1969). For a broader and more detailed view of the rule-making
process, see D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EvIDENCE § 485 (1980 and Supp. 1987).
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This provision appeared substantially unchanged in the revised
draft of March, 1971.11
The Advisory Committee's proposal represented a departure in
several respects from existing common law. Most notably, it ex-
panded the exception for statements against interest to include
statements against penal interest." 6 While the proposed rule would
have permitted the accused to offer exculpating third party con-
fessions, the introduction by the government of third party con-
fessions which inculpated both the declarant and the accused would
have been prohibited. The Advisory Committee Note cited Bru-
ton," 7 which "assumed the inadmissibility, as against the accused,
of the implicating confession of his codefendant."1 8 Apparently
in response to substantial opposition by the Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the Advisory Committee dropped the sen-
tence proscribing co-defendants' confessions offered to inculpate
the accused. 1 9 The House Judiciary Committee returned the sen-
tence which was "intended to codify Bruton" to the rule120 but the
Senate Judiciary Committee deleted it again because it codified
a constitutional evidentiary principle.'21 The final version was again
accompanied by a note indicating that the deletion of the last sen-
tence was made with the intent to leave constitutional principles
undisturbed.2
The language of the FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(3),
as finally adopted, provides an express exemption from the oper-
115. 51 F.R.D. 315,438-39 (1971).
116. This expansion to reach statements against penal interests was a rejection of the position taken by the
Court in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913), that the exception reaches only statements against
proprietary interests.
117. 46 F.R.D. 183, 385 (1969). The Advisory Committee Note apparently refers to footnote 3 in Bruton:
"We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible against him under
traditional rules of evidence." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 127 n.3.
118. 46 F.R.D. 183, 386 (1969).
119. The opposition from Senator McClellan is documented in his letter of August 12, 1971, to the Chairman
of the Permanent Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. 117 CONG. REc. 33642. 33648 (Sept. 28,
1971). Senator McClellan suggested the omission of the last sentence in the proposed rule because "on its face
it Ididl not state the law." Id. He cited Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971), as having "held that the use
of a confession of a co-conspirator implicating the other defendant did not contravene the Sixth Amendment
where the co-conspirator took the stand to testify, but disavowed the confession." Id.
120. FED. R. Evio. 804(b)(3) Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
12 1. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The Senate Judiciary Committee
deleted the sentence because:
the basic approach of the rules is to avoid codifying, or attempting to codify, constitutional evidentiary
principles, such as ...the sixth amendment right of confrontation. Codification of a constitutional
principle is unnecessary and, where the principle is under development, often unwise. Furthermore,
the House provision does not appear to recognize the exceptions to the Bruton rule, e.g., where the
codefendant takes the stand and is subject to cross examination; where the accused confesses ....
Id.
122. FED. R. EvIn. 804(b)(3) Conference Report.
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ation of the hearsay rule for an out-of-court statement against in-
terest by an unavailable declarant "if the statement so far tended
to subject him to . . criminal liability . that a reasonable man
in his position would not have made the statement unless he be-
lieved it to be true." '123 The rule requires corroboration if such
a statement is offered to exculpate the accused but it does not place
any restrictions on such statements offered to inculpate. The Ad-
visory Committee Note which accompanies the rule does,
however, continue to include this admonition:
Whether a statement is in fact against interest must be determined from the circumstances of each case.
Thus a statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody, may well
be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against 
interest.
124
Given the ambiguity created by the juxtaposition of the language
of the rule and its legislative history, the question of whether the
rule includes inculpatory against-interest statements remains un-
settled. Taking into account its legislative history, Judge Wein-
stein concludes that "the Rule should be interpreted to include this
language [that the against-penal-interest 'exception does not in-
clude a statement or confession offered against the accused in a
criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicat-
ing both himself and the accused']."' 2 This position is supported
by the inclusion in the Uniform Rules of Evidence of a provision
that a "statement or confession offered against the accused in a
criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicat-
ing both himself or herself and the accused, is not within this ex-
ception. " "' The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the
Advisory Committee Note, observed that "this and other courts
have found statements implicating a codefendant and made in
police custody to be inadmissible under the rule.""2 7 The Fifth Cir-
cuit has read into Rule 804(b)(3) a restriction requiring corrobo-
ration of statements against interest implicating the accused."2 8 In
123. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
124. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) Advisory Committee Note.
125. 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 804(b)(3)[031 at 804-10 (1979). The view that the drafters of the rule in-
tended inculpatory statements to be admissible is found in Comments, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and
Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (1978).
126. Rule 804(b)(3) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence parallels the Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) for
the most part but, in addition, it provides that a "statement or confession offered against the accused in a crimi-
nal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused is not within this
exception." UNIF. R. EvID. 13 U.L.A. (1987). There are also at least six states which have incorporated provi-
sions which put third party confessions inculpating the accused beyond the reach of the exception. Two other
states have provisions in their rules which require corroboration of such inculpating statements. D. LOUISELL
& C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 485 (1980 and Supp. 1987).
127. United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing United States v. Love, 592 F.2d
1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d at 345-46 & n.4).
128. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699-702 (5th Cir. 1978).
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United States v. Sarmiento-Perez,129 the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed
this corroboration requirement and strengthened the test for ad-
missibility by requiring "close examination of all of the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement in order to
determine whether it so contravenes the declarant's penal interest
that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the
statement accusing a third person unless he believed it to be
true.""'0 Observing that "[t]he Supreme Court has been at pains
to point out that the contours of the hearsay rule and those of the
confrontation clause are not wholly congruent," the Fifth Circuit
opinion expresses the difficulty in distinguishing between the re-
quirements of the hearsay rule and those of the confrontation
clause:
[I]t is in practice difficult to discern the precise line of demarcation between the indicia of reliability
that are sufficient to overcome confrontation problems and those that are sufficient to place an extraju-
dicial statement within the scope of a recognized exception to the hearsay rule ...
This difficulty of demarcation seems inevitable. With Dutton, the Supreme Court grounded con-
frontation values upon the selfsame bedrock of 'reliability' that traditionally has been the grounding
rationale for virtually all the exceptions to the hearsay rule. When the extrajudicial statement of an
unavailable declarant is admitted into evidence against a criminal defendant, confrontation issues are
unavoidably implicated.
Evidence that seems likely to fall afoul of the confrontation clause will most often fail to qualify
under any recognized hearsay exception. The result is that where the confrontation clause is implicat-
ed, it will tend inevitably to place the threshold of admissibility under the applicable hearsay exception
at a level that will pass constitutional muster.
When inculpatory hearsay is sought to be admitted under the aegis of a recognized exception to the
hearsay rule, the right to confront and cross-examine the declarant is being asked to yield to another
legitimate interest in the criminal trial process: the recognition that the trier of fact should be afforded
the opportunity to consider relevant hearsay that is sufficiently trustworthy. Nevertheless, the conse-
quent denial or diminution of so essential and fundamental a confrontation value as the opportunity
to cross-examine demands that the competing interest to which that value yields be 'closely examined.'
Thus, a clear distinction must be drawn between statements against penal interest that are offered
to exculpate a criminal defendant, as against those offered to inculpate him. The admission under Rule
804(b)(3) of against-penal-interest-of-declarant hearsay statements that inculpate a criminal defendant
results in the diminution of rights traditionally viewed as essential and fundamental components of
an accused person's right of confrontation. Therefore, sixth amendment values demand that the threshold
, . 131
measure of admissibility under Rule 804(b)(3) . . . be applied in light of... 'close examination.
Judge Tate's thoughtful opinion for the Fifth Circuit makes it
clear that what the Court has said about the confrontation clause
has helped to show how the confrontation clause and the rule
against hearsay function similarly to exclude testimony; what the
Court has said about the confrontation clause has not, however,
clarified that difference in the operation of the confrontation clause
and the hearsay rule which the Court has consistently declared
to exist.
1 31
129. United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981).
130. Id. at 1102.
131. Id. at 1099-1100.
132. Dutton v. Evans. 400 U.S. at 81-82; California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56.
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III. INSTANT CASE - LEE V. ILLINOIS
In Lee the question for review by the Supreme Court was
whether substantive use of the hearsay confession denied Lee's
rights under the Confrontation Clause."' As to the state's conten-
tion that Lee's sixth amendment rights were not violated since Tho-
mas was unavailable and his statement was sufficiently reliable
"to warrant its untested admission into evidence against Lee,"
13 '
the Court declined to address the issue of unavailability holding,
that "Thomas' statement, as the confession of an accomplice, was
presumptively unreliable and that it did not bear sufficient indepen-
dent 'indicia of reliability' to overcome that presumption." 135
Prefacing its decision in Lee with a review of confrontation
clause cases as applied to the states, the Court emphasized the
right of cross-examination as an essential element of
confrontation 3 and described the right to confrontation and the
right to cross-examination as a unitary requirement for meeting
the constitutional goal of fair trials.137 Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, viewed the right to confront and cross-examine
as serving both the symbolic function of assuring the appearance
of fairness in the administration of justice and the functional goal
of assuring reliability in trials.138 Specifically relating the right
to cross-examination to situations involving a co-defendant's con-
fession, the Court noted that its holdings have recognized that the
133. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2061 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 1I).
134. Id. The state argued alternatively that (1) Thomas was unavailable because "at all times prior to and
during trial he was possessed of his privilege against self incrimination, and could not be required to testify
in support of his detailed confession to murder" and (2) that the utility to Lee of cross-examination of Thomas
was so remote that "proof of unavailability [was] not required as a prerequisite to admission of [his] confes-
sion." Respondent's Brief at 13-14, Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986). For the latter argument, the state
relied on a footnote from Roberts which stated that a "demonstration of unavailability . . . is not always re-
quired. In Dutton v. Evans, for example, the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it
did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness." Id. at 14 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. at 65, n.7).
135. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
136. Id. The Court opened its discussion with a quote from Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), declaring
that it "cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-examination is included in the right
of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him." Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2061.
137. Id. at 2062. Again quoting Pointer, the Court continued: "[t]here are few subjects, perhaps, upon which
this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in the expression of belief that the right
to confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial
which is this country's constitutional goal." Id.
138. Id. Justice Brennan explicated the means by which the symbolic goal is served: "[Tihe right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice in which
the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails . . . [with] the confrontation clause ... ensuring that
convictions will not be based on the charge of unseen and unknown - and hence unchallengeable - individu-
als." He noted, however, that "[tihe right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is primarily a functional
right that promotes reliability in criminal trials." Id.
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"truth finding function of the Confrontation Clause is uniquely
threatened when an accomplice's confession is sought to be in-
troduced against a criminal defendant without the benefit of cross-
examination""9 because such statements of a co-defendant are es-
pecially unreliable. 0 Citing its unanimous holding in Douglas'.
that "the defendant's inability to cross examine [the accomplice]
as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-
examination secured by the Confrontation Clause,"' 2 the majority
explained that the Douglas holding "was premised on the basic
understanding that when one person accuses another of a crime
under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by in-
culpating another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and must
be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination."'
Justice Brennan noted that, following Douglas, the Court has
consistently viewed accomplices' confessions as presumptively un-
reliable evidence against criminal defendants," ' and in support
of this proposition, he cited Justice Harlan's view in Dutton that
an accomplice's confession resulting from formal police interro-
gation is unreliable evidence of the defendant's guilt'. and the
Court's holding in Bruton that a confession incriminating an ac-
complice is "inevitably suspect" and "devastating. '
In concluding the discussion of the right to confront and cross-
examine a presumptively unreliable co-defendant's confession, the
Court pointed to the striking similarity between Lee and Doug-
las: "In both cases, the hearsay in question was a confession made
by an alleged accomplice, and in neither case was the defendant
able to confront and cross examine the declarant."'" 7
Justice Brennan pointed out that in Lee the concerns that un-
derlie the confrontation clause are of "even greater consequence
139. 106 S. Ct. at 2062.
140. Id. In elaborating the dangers of admitting the accomplice's confession, the Court cited from its opinion
in Bruton, that such a confession
is hearsay, subject to all the dangers of inaccuracy which characterize hearsay generally ...More
than this, however, the post-arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed with
special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself,
a codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay
evidence.
Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2062 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 141 (White, J., dissenting)).
141. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
142. 106 S. Ct. at 2062 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)).
143. Id. at 2062-63.
144. Id. at 2063.
145. Id. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Dutton was based not on confrontation clause grounds but on due
process grounds. He was prepared, in any event, to hold that such a confession could not "be introduced as
evidence of the guilt of an accused, absent some circumstances indicating authorization or adoption." Id. (quot-
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than in Douglas""8 because in Lee, unlike Douglas, it was not
necessary for the Court to resort to conjecture as to whether the
factfinder would consider the uncross-examined hearsay; the judge
manifestly relied on Thomas' confession in finding Lee guilty." 9
Justice Brennan concluded that the judge's express reliance on Tho-
mas' presumptively unreliable confession in finding Lee guilty con-
stituted the occurrence of the very danger that the confrontation
clause is designed to prevent. 5 '
Illinois had advanced three bases for establishing the reliabili-
ty of Thomas' confession: (1) the circumstances of the confes-
sion; (2) the interlocking nature of Thomas' confession and Lee's
confession; and (3) the fact that Thomas' statement was against
his penal interest. The Court rejected all three bases.'
Rejecting Illinois' assertion that the circumstances of Thomas'
confession were sufficient to rebut the presumption of unreliabil-
ity, the Court viewed the circumstances surrounding his confes-
sion as supportive of the presumption of unreliability which
generally attaches to such accomplices' statements. The factors
the Court pointed to as indicating unreliability were: (1) Thomas
had originally refused to make a statement and his confession was
elicited only after he knew that Lee had implicated him and after
Lee had implored him to take the "rap" with her;... (2) Thomas'
statement was unsworn and untested by contemporaneous cross-
examination or its equivalent, and was elicited in response to ques-
tions from the police "who, having already interrogated Lee, no
doubt knew what they were looking for;"' 53 and (3) Thomas was
considering the possibility of becoming a witness for the state
against Lee. "'
The Court viewed these factors as giving Thomas a theoretical
motive "to mitigate the appearance of his own culpability by
spreading the blame or to overstate Lee's involvement in retalia-
148. Id.
149. Id.
150, Id. The Court also noted that while the prosecutor invited the trial judge to consider Thomas' confes-
sion, no claim of prosecutorial misconduct was made in regard to the prosecutor's conduct in bringing inadmis-
sible hearsay to the attention of the fact-finder. 106 S. Ct. at 2060 n.3.
151, Id. at 2064.
152. /d.
153. Id. The Court noted that the state's argument that Thomas' confession was found to be voluntary for
fifth amendment purposes did not speak to the question of whether the confession was free from any desire
or motive to distort his own or Lee's involvement.
154. Id.
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tion for her having implicated him in the murders." 5 The por-
tions of Thomas' confession which described Lee's conduct were
viewed as not against Thomas' interest in that they could represent
Thomas' attempt "to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge
himself, or divert attention to another."
' 15 6
The Court rejected Illinois' assertion that Thomas' confession
could be considered reliable because it interlocked with Lee's con-
fession. The Court read the two confessions as divergent on "the
very issues Ithat were] in dispute at trial: the roles played by the
two defendants in the killing of Odessa, and the question of
premeditation in the killing of Aunt Beedie."'
15 7
Justice Brennan pointed out that the interlocking confessions
doctrine of Parker v. Randolph"5 8 does not render a co-defendant's
confession reliable simply because some of its facts match some
of the facts in the defendant's confession.159 He suggested that a
major danger of this type of hearsay is its selective reliability,
i.e., while it may appear to be and may actually be reliable be-
cause it may "interlock" in some respects, it is presumptively un-
reliable as it relates to the defendant's "conduct or culpability."160
Justice Brennan modified the interlocking confession doctrine of
Parker with the following test for admissibility:
If those portions of the codefendant's purportedly 'interlocking statement' which bear to any significant
degree on the defendant's participation in the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by the defendant's
own confession, the admission of the statement poses too serious a threat to the accuracy of the verdict
155. Id. The Court suggested that this motive is further enhanced by the possibility that Thomas would be-
come Lee's adversary at trial. Justice Brennan thought that the record evidence demonstrated that Lee and Tho-
mas had lost any identity of interest they might formerly have had as accomplices and that it showed that they
had become instead, antagonists. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2065.
158. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 68 (1979).
159. 106 S. Ct. at 2064. Justice Brennan referred to an earlier opinion which seems to have foreseen the
situation in Lee. In that opinion, Justice Blackmun in Parker v. Randolph, discussed interlocking confessions
as follows:
The fact that confessions may interlock to some degree does not ensure, as a per se matter, that their
admission will not prejudice a defendant so substantially that a limiting instruction will not be curative.
The two confessions may interlock in part only. Or they may cover only a portion of the events in
issue at the trial. Although two interlocking confessions may not be internally inconsistent, one may
go far beyond the other in implicating the confessor's codefendant. In such circumstances, the admis-
sion of the confession of the codefendant who does not take the stand could very well serve to prejudice
the defendant who is incriminated by the confession, notwithstanding that the defendant's own confes-
sion is to an extent, interlocking.
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. at 79.
160. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2064.
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to be countenanced by the Sixth Amendment. In other words, when the discrepancies between the
statements are not insignificant, the codefendant's confession may not 
be admitted.
61
Applying this test to the facts of the case, Justice Brennan found
that while Thomas' confession and Lee's confession were congruent
in many respects, they were divergent with respect to the key is-
sues of premeditation and of Lee's participation in the death of
Odessa."6 Since the Court did not view these areas of divergence
as "irrelevant or trivial, ' ' 163 the confession could not be deemed
trustworthy in its entirety.
As to Illinois' contention that the hearsay confession should be
admitted as a "declaration against penal interest,"" the Court noted
briefly in a footnote that Illinois' categorization of the confession
as a declaration against penal interest "defines too large a class
for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis . . . [and] we de-
cide this case as involving a confession by an accomplice which
incriminates a criminal defendant. '
Holding that Lee's confrontation clause rights were violated by
the trial judge's consideration of Thomas' hearsay confession, the
Court left open the possibility that the error was harmless in the
context of all of the evidence against Lee and in light of the state's
substantive law of murder; this determination was left to the state
courts of Illinois.1"
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist. His opinion was that Thomas' con-
fession as evidence against Lee was constitutionally permitted be-
cause it met the Roberts requirements of unavailability and "indicia
of reliability."""' Although Thomas had been present in the court-
room at trial, Justice Blackmun concluded that he was unavaila-
ble because "he clearly would have invoked his privilege against
self incrimination if called to the stand to describe the murders
161. Id. at 2064-65. The Court in Parker had defined neither "confession" nor "interlocking" but had held
that "when the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury . . . admission of interlocking confes-
sions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution." Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. at 74 (1979).
162. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2065. Justice Brennan noted that Lee's confession (1) indicated that Tho-
mas had talked about "doing something" unspecified to Aunt Beedie but that her confession, unlike Thomas',
did not refer to any joint plan to "do something:" (2) gave no indication that she and Thomas planned to "do
something" with Odessa while Thomas' confession both indicated a joint plan to kill Odessa and detailed Lee's
participation in carrying out that plan. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2064 n.5.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2066.
167. Id. at 2067-68.
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he had committed with [Lee] ." 68 In reaching the conclusion that,
for purposes of the confrontation clause, a witness who invokes
the privilege against self incrimination is unavailable, Justice
Blackmun relied on the hearsay principle that "witnesses who suc-
cessfully invoke the privilege against self-incrimination are un-
available for purposes of determining whether their prior
statements are admissible under an exception to the hearsay
rule."169
Weighing the circumstances and the content of Thomas' con-
fession in terms of reliability, the dissent found the confession
reliable because (1) it was "thoroughly and unambiguously ad-
verse" to Thomas' penal interest;170 (2) it described Lee's partici-
pation in a manner which in no way minimized Thomas' own
culpability;171 (3) it was corroborated in large part by Lee's con-
fession and such divergences as existed between the two confes-
sions were not inconsistent with Thomas' story; 72 (4) it was entirely
consistent with the physical evidence;17 and (5) it, along with Lee's
confession, was voluntary."17 Taking the combined weight of these
indicia of reliability together with the practical unavailability of
Thomas, the dissent considered Thomas' confession constitution-
ally admissible against Lee.
168. Id. at 2067 n.3. Justice Blackmun concluded that not only would it have been futile for the state to
call Thomas to testify but also that the failure of the state to call him was not decisive because he was equally
as available to Lee as a witness as he was to the state. Acknowledging that, unlike Lee, the state had resources
by which it might have obtained Thomas' testimony at trial (e.g., by offering Thomas "a favorable sentencing
recommendation or the opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser offense"), Justice Blackmun concluded that the
social costs entailed in securing Thomas' testimony would have been significant and that the failure of the state
to use measures such as these did not render Thomas an available witness. Id. at 2067.
169. Although Justice Blackmun cited the FED. R. Evto. 804(b)(1) definition of unavailability, he drew no
distinction between prior testimony for which there is an established hearsay exception under the Federal Rules
(FED. R. EvID. g04(b)(1)) and a defendant's confession which falls into no such established category. Id.
170. Id. at 2069. The dissent noted that Thomas' confession is distinguished from the usually suspect co-
defendants' confessions which are "untrustworthy precisely because they are not unambiguously adverse to the
penal interest of the declarant." Id. at 2068. Citing Bruton (co-defendant had made a confession which was
admitted with a limiting instruction that it not be used against the defendant; the Court found that the "power-
fully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co-defendant ... are devastating to the defendant land] their
credibility is inevitably suspect," 391 U.S. at 135-36) and Douglas (the accomplice's confession seemed to
minimize his own culpability by identifying the defendant as the person who fired the single shot), Justice Black-
mun pointed out that confessions which serve the declarant's penal interest by shifting blame to another are
the ones to be considered unreliable. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
171. Id. at 2069 n.6. Thomas' statement was seen by the dissent as significantly different from the usual
co-defendant's confession in that Thomas' statements which inculpated Lee were inseverable from the portions
of the confession which were adverse to his own penal interest. His reference to a joint plan was as damaging
to him as to Lee and "subjected both defendants to possible charges of criminal conspiracy." Id.
172. id. at 2069-70. After identifying some salient details on which the confessions were virtually identical,
Justice Blackmun suggested that the divergence as to prior planning did not undermine the corroborative im-
pact on Lee's confession because (1) her own statement did not expressly rule out prior planning, and (2) Tho-
mas' claim of prior planning was not an attempt to shift blame to Lee. Id. at 2070.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2070-71.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Any contribution which Lee might make to the clarification of
the meaning of the confrontation clause must be assessed in light
of the Court's demonstrated preference for careful case-by-case
analysis of this issue.17 Confining the holding narrowly to the
facts of the case, Lee, if it stands for nothing else, must surely
stand for the proposition that it is constitutionally impermissible
for the judge in a joint bench trial to rely on a non-testifying co-
defendant's inculpatory confession in deciding the guilt of the
defendant unless the confession can meet the most stringent test
of reliability.176 The facts of the case suggest that the holding might
reach further; it might mean that in such a trial context, it is im-
permissible, because of the inherent unreliability of such state-
ments, to admit into evidence against the accused any out-of-court
inculpating co-defendants' statements or confessions. The facts
of Lee show that while Thomas' confession did inculpate Lee, it
was not characterized by the most egregious indicators of unrelia-
bility, i.e., it did not shift blame to Lee from himself;" and though
he was in police custody when he confessed, there was no indi-
cation of police pressure or threats." 8 The majority, however,
found that Thomas' confession, like other co-defendants' incul-
pating statements, carried such a strong presumption of unrelia-
bility that it could not be admitted against Lee."7 9 If the holding
in Lee extends so far as to exclude any inculpating co-defendant's
statement, then it would seem, in effect, to direct that the origi-
nal Supreme Court Advisory Committee's proposed prohibition
against admitting inculpatory statements against the defendant be
read back into Rule 804(b)(3). If the Court understands Rule
804(b)(3) to contain this prohibition or, at least, to require cor-
roboration as some lower federal courts have required, 8 ' then the
Court's decision in Lee could have been as easily reached by
analyzing Thomas' confession as hearsay for which there is no
established exception, as by analyzing it under the mandate of
the confrontation clause, as the Court did. The Court's reasoning
175. Justice Blackmun described the clarification process as a gradual one, "building on past decisions, drawing
on new experiences, and responding to changing conditions." Ohio v. Roberts, 449 U.S. at 65-66.
176. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2065.
177. id. at 2069.
178. Id. at 2071.
179. Id. at 2064-65.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 699-702 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the con-
frontation clause requires that hearsay offered against an accused must be reliable, the Court sought to "bring
Rule 804(b)(3) within this mandate of reliability" by requirng corroboration of statements against interest im-
plicating the accused).
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and result thus give little or no guidance as to how the rule against
hearsay and the confrontation clause are to be distinguished in
excluding evidence at criminal trials.
Assuming that Thomas' confession did not meet the require-
ments of Rule 804(b)(3), his statement was inadmissible hearsay.
The judge had indicated that he would ignore the statement in
deciding Lee's guilt.181 When he later expressly relied on Tho-
mas' confession, the judge had made a Bruton error.'82 He had,
in effect, been unable to follow his own limiting conditions."'
The judge's use of the confession in arriving at his opinion rebut-
ted the strong presumption that a judge in a bench trial is able
to disregard inadmissible evidence even though he has heard it.1"'
Although Lee parallels Bruton in that both involved the danger
that the factfinder would consider inadmissible evidence, the Lee
Court, aside from noting this danger, did not analyze Lee as a
Bruton error. This may be due in part to the distinguishing fact
noted by the Illinois Appellate Court that Lee differs from Bru-
ton in that Lee's own confession was in evidence against her; in
Bruton the defendant had made no such inculpatory statement. 5
Even though Thomas' confession inculpated Lee to a greater ex-
tent than did her own, this difference alone does not seem a suffi-
cient distinction to warrant departure from the teaching of Bruton,
that "in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting in-
structions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional
right of cross-examination" 8' and that when "the factfinder looked
181. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. at 2060. When counsel for Lee and for Thomas withdrew motions for sever-
ance and for trial by jury, Lee's counsel requested "the [trial] Court to consider the evidence separately for
each defendant.- In response, the judge said "it will be done that way.- Id.
182. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 45-59.
183. Id.
184. The fiction that judges can separate impermissible from permissible inference has been called into ques-
tion by a number of commentators. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZRURG in A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
cite Kalven and Zeisel's major study. THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (some judges indicated that they would have
decided certain cases differently from the jury because they knew facts which the jury did not) as support for
the view that judges cannot completely disregard evidence that they have heard. As additional support, they
cite the fact that three federal district court judges in Chicago, concerned that they will be unable to disregard
inadmissible evidence, provide in bench trials for a different judge than the one before whom the case is to
be tried to rule on evidence questions raised in limine. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH
TO EVIDENCE 152 n.8. 186 (1982).
185. In previous cases the Illinois court had found that
a very substantial difference exists between a case in which a jury hears a co-defendant's statement
incriminating a defendant who has made similar inculpatory admissions, and the Bruton type case in
which the co-defendant's statement is used against a defendant who has made no admissions. In the
former case the prejudice to the defendant, if any, is minimal and entirely insufficient to necessitate
retrial, particularly, where . . . defendant's guilt seems clear.
People v. Rosochacki, 41 111. 2d 483, 494 (1969). The Rosochacki rationale was followed in People v. Bassett.
56 11. 2d 285 (1974).
186. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 137.
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to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining peti-
tioner's guilt, admission of [co-defendant's] confession in this joint
trial violated petitioner's right of cross examination secured by
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.""1 7
Had the Court followed Bruton in deciding Lee, it seems it would
logically have had to decide that either (1) because the Bruton
cross-examination requirement could not be met, a non-testifying
co-defendant's confession could never be admitted in a joint bench
trial, or (2) in such situations there must be provision for sever-
ance, redaction, or separate admissibility hearings before another
judge in order to keep the trial judge from considering such power-
ful inadmissible evidence. The Court, however, may have wished
to treat the Illinois judge's reliance on the inadmissible evidence
as an aberration which does not undermine the presumption that
judges can generally disregard such testimony in arriving at a de-
cision. If so, the Court's reliance on Ohio v. Roberts... as con-
trolling the outcome of Lee may have been intended to create a
differential confrontation clause analysis depending on whether
the offending material is heard by a judge or by a jury. Such a
two-track confrontation clause analysis would mean that in the
context of a joint trial before a jury, the Bruton..9 rule would ex-
clude entirely a co-defendant's inculpatory confession unless it
were subject to cross-examination at trial. In a joint bench trial,
however, the judge could consider such evidence if the declarant
were unavailable and the statement met the Roberts' test for in-
dicia of reliability. The Court's use of Roberts in deciding Lee
might, however, have broader implications; the analysis may,
taken together with the general trend of confrontation clause opin-
ions, and with the recent holding in Inadi,' signal that the Court
is moving toward an acceptance of the rule against hearsay as the
standard for admissibility which will satisfy confrontation clause
requirements.
A review of the Court's decisions interpreting the confronta-
tion clause suggests that the major purpose of the clause is to pro-
187. Id. at 126.
188. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
189. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
190. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
191. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986). In its most recent decision prior to Lee, the Court in
Inadi stated that Roberts was to be read as confined to its facts, i.e., to situations involving prior testimony.
The Court specifically denounced the Third Circuit's interpretation of Roberts as prescribing a "clear constitu-
tional rule" applicable to out of court statements which required a showing of unavailability. Id. at 1124-25.
The analysis in Inadi relied heavily on the fact that the particular unconfronted testimony there, a nontestifying
co-conspirator's statements, was classified at common law as an exception to the hearsay rule and, under the
FED. R. Evto. 801(d)(2)(E) is categorized as an admission which is not hearsay. Id. at 1128 and n.12.
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tect "the integrity of the fact-finding process" in criminal trials.""2
The opinions suggest that the value of the constitutional guaran-
tee lies not in actually being face-to-face with the accused but in
the opportunity to test the truth of his accusations."' In the Court's
early cases, this right was defined basically as the right to cross-
examine the witness against the defendant." ' In the later cases,
this right was framed in terms of guarantees of trustworthiness
which were the substantial equivalent of cross-examination. "
From the very earliest cases, however, the defendant's right to
test the truth and reliability of the statements made by witnesses
against him was not seen as an absolute right;.9. it was circum-
scribed by the competing needs of society to use the evidence in
the interests of public safety and to prevent the "manifest failure
of justice."' 7
The hearsay rule, like the confrontation clause, was developed
to permit an accused to exclude from trial untruthful statements
which were not subject to testing at trial by cross-examination.19
Exceptions to the hearsay rule have been developed on the two
traditional bases of reliability and necessity. The two bases
represent the competing interests to be weighed and balanced in
the consideration of what hearsay evidence is admissible at tri-
al. 99 The reliability basis for admission is usually invoked to pro-
tect the accused, i.e., if evidence is to be used to subject the
accused to legal sanctions, the evidence must be trustworthy. The
necessity basis, on the other hand, is invoked in the societal in-
terest of going forward with prosecutions even when the person
providing the evidence is not available to testify.
The demands of the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule
are thus parallel, if not identical, in that the requirements of each
are finally determined after weighing the conflicting needs of the
accused on the one hand and of society on the other. It is the ten-
sion between the reliability basis and the necessity basis which
gives rise to the disagreement over whether the confrontation
clause permits a particular item of evidence to be used at trial,
or whether a particular category of exception to the hearsay rule
may be used systematically to permit use of certain classes of evi-
192. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
193. Id.
194. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
195. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
196. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
197. Id. at 244.
198. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244 (3d ed. 1984).
199. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 252-324 (3d ed. 1984).
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dence at trial. The confrontation clause issue arises when the con-
siderations of necessity outweigh the considerations of reliability.
The Court, in setting forth the Roberts requirements for admissi-
bility under the confrontation clause, essentially outlines the two
traditional bases for allowing exceptions to the hearsay rule. The
unavailability requirement represents the necessity base; the in-
dicia of reliability requirement represents the reliability base.2"0
The unavailability analysis, like the necessity analysis, seems to
suggest that if a hearsay declarant is not available at trial, socie-
ty, rather than forego his evidence altogether, is willing in some
instances to accept his evidence with the attendant risk of its un-
reliability. Similarly, the "indicia of reliability" requirement
parallels the reliability base of hearsay analysis; it suggests that
evidence cannot be admitted against the accused unless it has some
guarantees of trustworthiness.20 Since the values to be protected
and the analytical process for decision-making are essentially the
same for confrontation clause and hearsay issues, there arguably
would be utility in the express acceptance by the Court of the re-
quirement of the hearsay rules as a prima facie showing of ad-
missibility for confrontation clause purposes. The adoption of a
confrontation clause admissibility test which is explicitly linked
to the hearsay rule and its exceptions could serve as a useful indi-
cator of trial rights of confrontation. If, as in Lee, an evidentiary
submission cannot survive the rule against hearsay test for ad-
missibility, then it clearly does not meet the constitutional require-
ment for confrontation. If the proffered testimony is within a
well-established exception to the rule against hearsay it has, by
definition, been balanced and weighed against the competing in-
terests of necessity on the one hand and reliability on the other.
Rather than bringing about a dilution or diminution of the con-
stitutional guarantee of confrontation, an approach which treats
hearsay admissibility requirements as prima facie establishment
of confrontation rights could serve to strengthen the hearsay rules.
The more stringent interpretation and application of hearsay rules
could enhance fact-finding procedures at trial and further the goals
of justice. To allow admissibility to be determined by hearsay rules
does not contravene the values underlying confrontation. While
the Court may be understandably loath to relegate a constitu-
tional question to the decisions of a rule-making body, that course
200. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 64 (1981).
201. California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 155.
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seems preferable to the Court's insistence on a conceptual differ-
ence, the nature of which it has yet to articulate.
D. Anne McInvale
